Introduction
'l'his c.onmmnical, ion aims t() clarify 1;11(' . conce.l)t el (:oh(,renc(~ in knowledge rel)res(mtation for natural language discourses and to pose tim first foundations tk)r formal rel)re.sentation and autotrmtic pro. cessiug of coherence.
We must emphasiz(: tirst that coherence in natm ral language disc()urses may result from incoherent parts : a t)arL o['a discern:st may 1)c contradictory with what is said in other parts without questiou--ing the coh(.'rencc of the whoh~. For examI)le, a (li--gression, a sut)p(/sition, an invalid hypothesis may be inehlded as a part of a dis(;om:se and ruled out l)y what folh)ws. So, a "lapse of memory" el)crates often in text coml)rehension arid [)rotecl,s the text ['rein dee]) incoherence. This means, of course, that coherence in natural language discourses is quite diffecent from tim consistency in a mat|w,-matit:al theory, which has Lo be consistent in each o[' its sets of i)rol)ositions. So, a cohcr(mce theory for natural language representation systenls must take into account this fact and limit the c()herence vcrilication to parts of texts actually asserted.
At a de('q) level at least, we pose the hypothesis that a text is generally coherent. So the llrob-]era we address to is to try to detect incoherence. Though the incoherence of a text may result from a lot of phenomena, we restri (-t 'l'he individuals of the knowledge base are objects. This base is divided into worlds. A world is a structured set of objects which is coherent : the exceptions, change of meanings are taken into account by a change of world. A world is divided into two universes : its intension and its extension. The intension contains those objects whose representation is supposed valid for speakers and situations related to discourse enunciation aitd to the application dolnain : there exists a consensus between the speakers of the discom:se about these objects, which reflects "general" background knowledge (77~e dog is a stupid and spiteJ)U animal), The intensional objects are then kinds of "logical" concepts in their world. The extension of a world contains objects which are particular to a specific situation, a specific time, ... (Peter's dog barked all night long). There is inheritance from intension to extension of the same world, but the extensions of two different worlds do not communicate. In case of change of world, a complex inheritance procedure must transmit only knowledge which insures the coherence of the new world from the. old intension to the new one (This, also stresses tit(; necessity to be able to detect incoherence in a discourse).
There are three kinds of objects in the model (and hence in any world and universe) : the individual objects, the action schemata [Gallo and Rouault, 1992] and the state schemata.
The individual objects
In our model, art individual object has the following structure: [Rouault, 1992] Status World Universe Cardinality Detinitional part Denomination Other-names Structural Functive
Status
This part imticate the conditions of validity of an object. It be composed of several objects:
World A discourse cart generate worlds. For each object, the system must specify in what world it must be introduced, where it is valid and where we can make inferences that bring it into play. We therefore pose:
M e World (I)
I is tit(', name of the described object. "world" is the formative functor of name, the variable M is the value of the world that the discourse created. When the knowledge coming from the discourse is incoherent with the knowledge base, there is world change. This change can come equally from a difference of view points between spe.akers expressed in the discourse [Fredj, :1992] .
Universes An universe denotes to a couple (I,I{) formed of an intension (I) and an extension (1{,). The object is defined in the world by a formative %nctor of name, from I [Berrendonner and Renault, 1991] .
U 5 Universe (l) U takes the vahie Inl or Ea:t.
Individual and ('lass An object can be an individual or a class. This distinction is based on the singular [ plural opposition. The individuality is defined by a forlnative fimctor of name, from l:
In ¢ ind~v (I) in takes the value Ind or CI 2.3.2 Definit, ional part of an object Here, we discovered two kind of sub-objects: those which are part of the described object and those which relate the object descl:ibed a.nd others objects of the world. The name of an ob.iect represents the sub-object of the denomination.
N c de'aomin, al, ion ([)
We also call associate to a name of an object other synonyms. These sub-objects arc defined by the formative flmetor of nalne whose the argument is the name of object.
Ni g other-names (I)
Structural sub-objects represent the part o[' ingredience, "part-all", in the sens of" the mereelegy. It means tltat it describe.s the. relation between an object and its constitive parts. They are of the form: I e in~ir (,U Object Iis a part of objecl, J. i.e. The 'wheel is a parl of the bike.
Functive. It indicates a relation between the object considered and another object. This relation is marked on the surface by a verb or normalised verbal form [Berrendonner and al, 1992] . A functive has the following form:
f (s; ,J)
Where Iis the object described and J is the object with which i is connected by the functivc f
Predicative obje('.ts
The functives of an individual object act as relations between objects. We have to pose the properties of such relations : depending on if they refer to an action or a state, a relation is defined by an action schema or a state schema. An action schema contains the following sub-objects [Gallo and Renault, 1992] :the name(s) of the action, the nature of the arguments, the state(s) evenl;ually entailed by the action (result, pro(|uct, ...) and the scenario associated to the i)rocess, whi('it depends on the discourse <lo,min.
Structuring of the knowledge base
In the intensional universe of a world, the in(lividuals (also named types) are nodes of a lattice (the lattice o1" types), the hierarchy l)eing represente.d by t;he ingredient( fun(tot. The types are also linked by their stru('tura] and fun(tire sub=ol<jects. Of course, the extensional objects arc, lmke([ also/>y their structural and functives subobje(:ts. And each such object is in accord with its un<lerlying tyl>e.
3 Negations in the object-based knowledge representation model
Negations and objects
']']m aim of the mo(l(;l is to rot)resent dynamically the knowledge associated with a (list(mrs( at a given point (time) of its progression. Thus, each object may (;hang( during this progress : we must then (listinguish betwe(:n this "punctu&l" repre senCation and the history of objects (which ig is necessary to maintain in the (:as( of a dialogue, for exaniple). We are concerned here only with the updating of a knowledge/)ase containing the knowledge valid for a discourse at a given time of its progression. Un(ier ~his restriction, the knowledge stored in the base is positive : when the discern:s( asserts a negatiw ~, fact (Do(is arc not slupid), this presttpl)OScs that the positive corresponding fiu:t (Doqs arc slupid) has ah:e~dy been asserted (exl)licitly or implicitly) nnd that a eonl, radiction may arise. In a mono-sl)eaker discourse (text), the general situation seems to be : tim assertion of a negative fact simply (:rases the positive one (of course, this erasing is virtual when the positive fact is only l>resul)posed). In a multi-speaker discourse (dialogue, for example, a negotiation is sell(able to de tide which of the two possibilities (the positive or the negative fact) is to be incht(h~ in the knowledge base. In all these cases, we have to be able to infer properties about objects from negative assertions; which in tttrtt, need to re.present the formal properties o[" different kinds of negations operating on sub-objects of an object.
3.2

Negation on types
As indicate(l l)reviously, only the intensional objects (the types) haw.' a " h)gical" behaviour : they represent generM knowledge valid in the discourse. The infer('.n(:0~ rules about negations are valid only it, the intensional universe. We then have to define what are the types of negations involved in the type rel)resentation.
3.2.1.
Negation about the worht The type is negated in the present worhl but mq> posed valid elsewhere.
For the linguists, the negation is not a simple problem For tit(: mathematical logiciau, a negation is a simple problem
Starting from a worhl where the negation is a, simple problem (which, [or example, is matheTnatieal logician), thc previous assertion entails tim opening of a new world, in which the new fact is asserted (7'he ncgation is uot a simple problem). When a discourse is expressed by mono-speaker, the assertion <)f a positive fact (the ncgation is not a simple fact) provoke a contradiction in the same world. This contradi<:tion can 1)e based at least on the dill'create betwec.n subobjects of type: 'is ~, 'is not'. The solution seemingly substitutes a positive fact by a negative fa.ct one.
3.2.2
Negation about tim universe A fact preserLted as a type is negated as such and related to extensional objects (or the converse) : 7'hc doq is not a stupid animal, but Fctcr's is.
3.2.3
Negation about the cardinality it is sitnply a change of v;Jtte elf tile, eardinality value.
3.2.4
Negation about denominations Negation can focus on the "denominations" a.nd "others-names" sub-objects, l)enyi,g a "denomination" or "other-natncs", means to denying a property of the object. [n this (:a.se, a new prop(~rty is sld)stit,ed to a s.b-object. [';xamplc: the pcrsonal computer is uot an 'IBM', but a 'COPAM+ '. Note, belbre, replacing a ne.w property~ the me(hi must verify that the new property is really a, property o| a lypc because there is a case: where a substitution makes no sense: the personal compaler is not an 'IBM', but a 'print(r"
3.2.5
Negation on strnctural snb-objects Here it is the ingrcdien(:e relation whi(:h is negated i.e.
7'he wall is part of a housc.
[n some (:rises, the he:gallon of [A isingr It] suggests the ingredi(mcc of the object A to another type (J, such that there exists a type 1) which is greater than 13 and (7 in the lattice of types :
The spoke wheel is not a part of a ear (it Zs part of a bike').
Negation on notional sub-obje(-ts
7'he lcavcs arc green/ The leaves arc not green
'['he infer(nee possibilities from the negative assertion arc: of two kinds : -There is a finite opposition between the notion and its "lexical negation"
(Blood is red / 111ood is not rcd= It is (>f another eolour).
-There is a contimmm (as in big/small) and we can not infer small from not big.
3.2.7
Ne.gation on fun(tire sub-objects As indicated previously, the uuinber of a. Another interesting example is 'All students succeed' : we assert a property about the class student and, then, specify that the class is studious, that is : the property is valid for all individuals of the (:lass. in other words, that the class is the extensional projection of the type student: As in previous example, (,he negation can operate on all (the class is not studious) or on tire property asserted about ,~11 students.
4
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an object-based knowledge representation model that allows to extract and to represent knowledge in the knowledge base from discourse. This model can be used in the context of man-machine dialogue or for information retrieval. We have posed the problem of coherence as regarding the knowledge represented in the knowledge base, taking into account the apparent contradictions within discourse. The incoherence can be result fi:om a lot of phenomena but we restrict ourselves in this communication to incoherence stemming from negation. All the cases treated (among others) show that a surface negation does not always fit a deep negation and, in fact, seldom entails ~n incoherence. Consequently, the negation cart have art effect in object-based knowledge representation model such as to update properties of objects but it rztrely provobe ~n incoherence between the objects of discourse and the objects of knowledge base,
